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Abstract1— Cyber security experts in the U.S. and around the
globe assess potential threats to their organizations by evaluating
potential attackers’ skills, knowledge, resources, access to the
target organization and motivation to offend (i.e. SKRAM).
Unfortunately, this model fails to incorporate insights regarding
online offenders’ traits and the conditions surrounding the
development of online criminal event. Drawing on contemporary
criminological models, we present a theoretical rationale for
revising the SKRAM model. The revised model suggests that in
addition to the classical SKRAM components, both individual
attributes and certain offline and online circumstances fuel cyber
attackers’ motivation to offend, and increase the probability that
a cyber-attack will be launched against an organization.
Consistent with our proposed model, and its potential in
predicting the occurrence of different types of cyber-dependent
crimes against organizations, we propose that Information
Technology professionals’ efforts to facilitate safe computing
environments should design new approaches for collecting
indicators regarding attackers’ potential threat, and predicting
the occurrence and timing of cyber-dependent crimes.
Keywords— Hackers, Cyber-Dependent Crime

I. INTRODUCTION
Computers and computer-networks (i.e. an interconnected
collection of autonomous computers that allow an easy
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exchange of information between users) [1] have become an
integral part of American industry, business and government.
Their efficient operation is increasingly critical to the survival
of the USA and its organizations [2]. However, next to
supporting legitimate business activities and facilitating
opportunities to interact with employees, clients and vendors,
the heavy reliance of large organizations on computers and
computer networks increases their vulnerability to a wide range
of cyber-dependent crimes (i.e. all these crimes that emerge as
a direct result of computer technology and the internet and that
could not exist without it) [3,4]. Indeed, numerous reports
suggest that large corporations and governmental agencies
experience a wide range of computer focused crimes including
system-trespassing (or hacking), website defacement,
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, and malicious
software infections [5-7], with an estimated $400 bilion annual
cost to the global economy from these crimes [8].
To deal with these new and increasing threats and facilitate
more secure computing environments, CISOs in large
organizations and their teams evaluate the threats to their
organizations periodically and ensure that their organizations
apply up-to-date security solutions that are designed to prevent,
detect, and mitigate malicious cyber activities [9]. However,
these efforts fall short in predicting the type and timing of an
attack against an organization due to the difficulties involved in
collecting and analyzing reliable information about hacker
groups, their intentions, and tools to develop meaningful
indications and warnings of potential attacks. As a result,
information technology teams are required to employ scattered
security solutions, and only rarely focus attention on concrete
and viable threats. This is unfortunate since although online
criminals consistently look for opportunities to attack potential
targets, attacks against either target of opportunity or targets of
choice are launched only under specific set of conditions and
circumstnaces. Therefore, we propose that a successful

organizational cyber security strategy should draw on deep
understanding of how conditions conducive to cyber-attacks
evolve, as well as awareness to both online and offline
circumstances that increase online-offenders’ situational
motivation to offend. Adopting such an approach for cyber
security requires the development and implementation of new
tools that allow the collection and analysis of information
about online criminals and the concrete emerging threats they
pose to an organization in real time. Below, we outline the
theoretical rationale that supports the suggested approach.
II. ASSESSING ATTACKERS’ POTENTIAL THREAT TO AN
ORGANIZATION
The growing number of victims of cyber dependent crimes
in the U.S. and around the world, as well as the wide variation
in victims’ demographic characteristics (ranging from large
organizations to private individuals), encouraged scientific
explorations around cyber-criminals and their operations
against online targets. Those investigations yielded several
hackers typologies that mainly differentiate between hackers’
level of malicious intents (for instance white, black and grey
hackers [10]), skill levels (i.e. low, mid and high [11, 12]), and
motivation to launch a cyber attack (for instance, thrill,
monetary gain, revenge, recreation, ideology and exploration)
[13]. Consistent with these typologies, Parker [14] developed a
model for assessing attackers’ (both individuals and groups)
potential threat to organizational information systems.
Specifically, Parker suggested that when considering the
implementation of new cyber-security strategies in an
organization, information security professionals should assess
five key elements in the potential profile of those who may be
interested in launching attacks against the organizations, and
address these elements accordingly. The five elements are
Skills, Knowledge, Resources, Authority and Motivations (i.e.
SKRAM). Skills pertains to potential offenders’ aptitude,
expertise and competency to launch particular cyber-dependent
crimes. Knowledge refers to offenders’ familiarity with facts
about different attack methods and tools, as well as
understanding of information systems that are used by potential
targets. Both skills and knowledge could be acquired by online
offenders over time through either informal or formal training
and collaboration. Resources refers to offenders’ access to
means like time, money, hardware, software and other types of
technologies which enable them to initiate cyber-dependent
crimes. Authority pertains to offenders’ access to facilities or
information systems. And finally, motives refer to the
underlying reasons behind online offenders’ involvement in
online crime. Indeed, online offenders’ motives to engage in
wide range of cyber-dependent crimes may vary quite a bit,
and include a desire to explore computer technology, the thrill
of engaging in illegal activities, revenge, ideology, and/or
monetary gain. Importantly, Parker [14] suggests that
offenders’ motives could determine the identity of potential
victims, in addition to the methods and tools that will be used
by online offenders to launch a cyber-dependent crime event.
Reffering to the interaction between these five key elements,
Parker proposes that online offender’s potential SKRAM can
increase over time to become a greater threat to a target.
Moreover, the threat potential imposed by multiple online
offenders and online crime groups increases substantially

through synergistic activities, and in turn, increases the threat
potential for the organization.
Parker’s model has served as an important guideline to
Information Technology officers, security professionals, law
enforcement investigators and policy makers who aim to
identify the risk of cyber-dependent crimes against
organizations and build more effective security policies and
defense systems against different type of hackers [15].
However, although useful in identifying potential online risks
to organizations, the model carries two main problems. First, it
does not take into consideration individual level factors that are
known to be antecedents of individual involvement in deviance
and crime. Specifically, extensive criminological research
suggests that various demographic charactaristics and
personality traits are key predictors for influencing individuals’
decision to initiate a criminal event [16-17]. Second, this model
(like many other recent typologies (for instance [18])
elaborates factors like revenge, monetary gain, obsession and
thrill seeking as key motivations for individuals online offend.
By doing so, it seems like Parker adopts [19] defenition of
individual motivation to launch a cyebr attack as both the
reasons for individuals engagement in cyber-dependent crimes
as well as the measure of the degree to which the attack will
repeat. However, the common premise among modern
criminologists suggests that individuals’ needs and values
cannot explain individuals’ involvement in crime since the
same needs and values could be obtained through non-criminal
behaviors [20]. Accordingly, monetary gain, revenge or thrill
seeking are not obtained solely through involvement in crime.
In fact, individuals who pursue a normative lifestyle may end
up obtaining financial gain, revenge or excitement by simply
pursuing legitimate life style (for instance attending school,
working for a respectable company or going on an exciting
trip). Therefore, these desires and goals cannot explain
individuals’ involvement in crime, and should not be confused
with one’s motivation to offend. Instead, extensive
criminological literature suggests that individual’s motivation
to offend comes either from within [21], and/or from the
environment [22-23].
We believe that this theoretical
elaboration could be of interest to information technology and
network security teams in organizations since it factors in
valuable information that could predict the occurrence, types
and timing of cyber-dependent crimes against organizations.
III. THE MOTIVATION TO OFFEND IN THE CRIMINOLOGICAL
LITERATURE
In general, criminologists who seek to understand the
etiology of crime emphasize two approaches that explain
individual motivation to offend. The first suggests that the
motivation and the drive to offend originate in an individual’s
psychology and personality traits, while the second approach
emphasizes environmental cues as key for the development of
the motivation to offend. Criminological explanations that
focus on individual attributes and internal processes as key
factors that determine an individual’s involvement in crime
highlight the role of decision-making processes [24], weak
self-control [25], and the absence of coping mechanisms that
allow individuals to handle with negative emotions in a
legitimate way [26]. In contrast, criminological models that

perceive the motivation to offend as originated in the
environment, emphasize the role of socialization and learning
[20, 23], as well as of situations conducive to crime [22] in
increasing individual’s motivation to initiate a criminal event.
We briefly detail the underlying assumptions of these key
criminological models, and link them to individual’s
probability to launch cyber-dependent crimes.
A. Individual based explanations of crime
Rational Choice and Deterrence- Rational choice models
assume that human beings are rational, self-interested actors
who seek to minimize personal cost while maximizing personal
gain [24,27]. An important implication of such perspectives in
the context of criminal behaviors is that individual behavior
can be altered by the threat and imposition of punishment as
well as the availability of rewards. While early work on
rational choice emphasized the role of sanctions in deterring
individuals from engaging in crime [28], contemporary
scholars discuss the relationships between various aspects of
sanctioning (for instance formal vs informal) and individual
deviant outcomes.
Clarke and Cornish’s [29] extension of the rational choice
theory emphasizes the need to understand criminals’ decisionmaking processes in the contexts of their lifestyles, experiences
and situations they encounter. According to these scholars,
criminal decision-making takes place within social, physical
and situational contexts that shape offenders’ perception of the
world around them [29]. Thus, individuals’ assessment of costs
and benefits are subjective and bounded. Accordingly, under
certain circumstances, risks that once deterred criminals are no
longer effective and deterring, and rewards that were
previously ignored become extremely attractive [30]. Applying
Clarke and Cornish’s rational in the context of cyberdependent crimes, we argue that when potential rewards for
launching a cyber-dependent crime outweigh potential costs,
cyber-criminals will be more likely to launch a criminal event
[31-33].
Weak Self-Control- Following the classical criminological
tradition, Gottfredson and Hirschi [25] perceive criminal
behavior as a consequence of the variably restrained human
tendency to seek pleasure and avoid pain. In line with this
view, these authors suggest that the tendency toward crime and
deviance can be explained by an individual’s level of selfcontrol. Those lacking self-control are characterized as
impulsive, insensitive, physical, risk seeking, short-sighted and
nonverbal. In their seminal work, Gottfredson and Hirschi view
individuals with low levels of self-control as unable to resist
temptations, and as prone to act on criminal opportunities to
engage in crime. In line with this theoretical model, we suspect
that low self-control individuals are more likely to take
advantage of online opportunities to engage in cyber-dependent
crimes and launch cyber dependent criminal events then low
self-control individuals [36].
Strain, Frustration and Crime- Agnew’s General Strain
Theory [26] stresses that an individual’s experiences of strains
such as blocked goals, the removal of valued stimuli, or the
imposition of negative stimuli may provoke negative emotions
such as anger and frustrations, which in turn, could motivate

individuals’ use of deviant behavior to deal with the negativity.
Agnew assumes that strain is unpleasant and may upset an
emotional equilibrium, so a strained individual will try to do
something to alleviate the strain or correct the emotional
disequilibrium that it creates. Most of the time, and for most
people, strain produces conventional cognitive or non-deviant
behavioral and emotional coping. However, sometimes, and
under some conditions, strain leads to deviant behavior or
unconventional, although not necessarily deviant, coping.
Agnew details aspects of strain that enhance the likelihood of
leading to deviant adaptations. He focuses particularly on
cumulatively and the ratio of negative to positive factors, but
he also notes the importance of the magnitude, recency,
duration and clustering of stress inducing situations. Moreover,
strains that are more likely to result in crime are strains that
seen as unjust, are seen as high in magnitude, are associated
with low social control and create some pressure or incentive
to engage in crime (Agnew 2002). Consistent with the General
Strain perspective, we propose that negative experiences
increase cyber criminals’ negative emotions, and in the absence
of legitimate coping skills, increase their likelihood to launch
cyber-dependent crimes.
B. Environmental based explanations of crime
Learning To Be a Criminal- The social learning theory
[34] has its underpinnings in the psychological literature, and
suggests that individuals learn how to become criminals from
their social environment. Specifically, this theory proposes that
excessive exposure to definitions favorable towards violating
the law over definitions that are unfavorable towards the
violations of laws, is the underlying cause for individuals’
adoption of a criminal lifestyle and involvement in deviance
and crime. According to this theory, the learning process
involves the learning of motivations (i.e. rationalizations for
the act) and techniques (i.e. skills and tools), and draws on the
balance of anticipated rewards and punishments for engaging
in a criminal behavior. All in all, past criminological research
has already found support for the key theoretical assumption of
social learning theory in the context of computer hacking.
Specifically, several studies reported that hackers maintain peer
relationships with other hackers [35] and that peer associations
are important for introducing new hackers to both hacking
tools and methods [36].
Situations Conducive to Online Crime- Briar and Piliavin
[22] suggested that all people are capable of deviant and
exhibit criminal behaviors under the right circumstances.
Specifically, according to these theoreticians, situationally
induced stimuli of relatively short duration can influence
individuals’ values and behaviors in such a way that will lead
to a decision to engage in illegal behaviors, independent of
their personality traits and commitment to conformity.
Drawing on Briar and Piliavin’s claims, and emphasizing the
centrality of offenders’ decision-making processes in
determining involvement in deviance and crime, Clarke
differentiates (1995) between individual decisions to become
involved in crime (i.e. criminal involvement) and decisions to
become involved in a particular crime (i.e. criminal event).
According to Clarke, individuals first decide whether they are
willing to become involved in crime. This decision is largely

influenced by past learning and experiences (including moral
code) and a range of background characteristics (demographic
and social)[37]. Once the choice to get involved in crime is
made, individuals need to decide to commit particular offenses.
This decision is largely determined by the immediate situations
individuals encounter. Importantly, Clarke acknowledges the
prevalence of situations conducive to crime in the life of most
people, and the commission of risky behaviors and illegal acts
by both “ordinary citizens” and “hardened offenders.”
Incorporating this insight with the notion that the decision to
initiate a risky behavior is induced by the absence of moral
opprobrium attached to criminal opportunities, Clarke contends
that offenses like trespassing and theft may be effectively
prevented by increasing the pressure to comply with the law. In
the absence of such pressure, situations conduce to crime will
emerge, and increase the probability of individuals to initiate
criminal events. Thus, consistent with the underlying premise
of situational explanations of crime we posit that the
emergence of situations conducive to online crime increase
cyber-criminals’ probability to launch a cyber-dependent crime
event.
IV. REVISED SKRAM (DSK-RAMG) MODEL
Based on the rationale discussed in these criminological
models, we propose a revision to Parker’s SKRAM [14].
Specifically, although we acknowledge the necessity to
consider cybercriminals’ skills, knowledge, resources,
authority and motivation for predicting organizational risks of
cyber-dependent crimes, we suggest refining the concept of
motivation, and adding two additional predictive elements for
assessing organizations’ potential risks from cyber-criminals:
online offenders’ demographic and personal attributes and
goals (i.e. DSK-RAMG). We believe that revision of this
model could prove useful in improving Information
Technology managers’ efforts to assess the risk posed to their
organizations by range of cyber criminals.
A. Attackers’ demographic and personality traits.
Parker’s model fails to account for online criminals
individuals traits as a potential risk factors to organizations
cyber security. However, several psychological and
criminological studies identify individual’s demographic and
personality attributes that are associated with cyber-dependent
criminals. For instance, [38] report that hackers tend to be
male, obsessive and explorers. [12] profiles hackers as young,
intelligent, and loners. Hackers are also reported to come from
middle class status, have poor social and communication skills,
low self-esteem, and a strong desire to succeed [39]. Bossler
and Burruss [36] find that computer hackers are likely to have
lower levels of self-control. Finally, Young and associates [40]
demonstrate that computer hackers employ rational decision
making process before engaging in cybercrime by perceiving
high utility value from hacking, little informal sanctions, and a
low likelihood of punishment. Moreover, these scholars report
that computer hackers tend to exhibit high levels of moral
disengagement.
Drawing on these studies, and the criminological school of
thought that ties individual’s personality traits with the
probability to offend, we suspect that knowledge regarding

cyber-dependent criminals’ demographic and personality traits
could be useful in predicting the occurrence, type and timing of
cyber-dependent crime against specific organizations. For
instance, we suspect that highly impulsive cyber-criminal will
be more likely to launch cyber-dependent crimes against
organization of interest than cyber criminals who are only
slightly impulsive [36]. Moreover, impulsive online criminals
are more likely to initiate higher volume and types of cyberdependent crimes. Similarly, we suspect that online offenders
with lower levels of Thoutfully Reflective Decision Making
(TRDM) [41] may be more volatile against less sophisticated
targets, and less effective in generating well thought and cyberdependent crimes against large organizations.
B. Situational motivation to launch a cyber event
Next to the role of personality, we emphasize the role of
situational motivation for increasing online offenders’
potential risk to launch cyber-dependent crimes against large
organizations. All in all, Cornish and Clarke [42] identify five
broad situations conducive to the development of offline
criminal events. The first are any circumstances under which
offenders need to invest relatively low amount of effort for
initiating crime (for instance the absence of locks on doors).
The second are situations in which the risk of getting caught
and punished are low (for instance the absence of security
guards and CCTV cameras in public places). The third type of
circumstances are situations in which the potential rewards
from the criminal event are relatively high (for instance
expensive piece of jewelry). The fourth type of situations
conducive to crimes are situations that increase individual
emotional arousals (for instance disputes). Finally, the last set
of situations conducive to crime are all these situations in
which offenders can excuse and justify their involvement in
crime (for instance the lack of behavioral rules in a public
park).
Translating these situations to the online environment, one
can identify a wide range of both offline and online situations
that could increase online offenders’ situational motivation to
launch cyber-dependent crimes. For instance, knowledge
regarding computer vulnerabilities reduce online offenders’
efforts to break security on a system, and in turn, increase the
probability they will try to gain an illegitimate access to
organizational computers [43]. The availability of unencrypted
data as well we the absence of surveillance on either a
computer or computer network, reduce online offenders risk
of detection and punishment, and in turn increase their
probability to launch cyber dependent crimes [44]. The
emergence of online black markets and hackers’ forums over
the dark net increase online offenders’ potential rewards from
engaging in online crimes, and in turn, increase the situational
motivation to launch cyber-dependent crime events [45].
Political events like wars and military provocations, may
increase potential online offenders anger and frustrations, and
in turn, increase their situational motivation to launch a cyberdependent crime against rival political entities (for instance
the alleged cyber-attacks initiated by Russia on Estonian
organization for several days in response to the relocation of a
Soviet-era grave marker (i.e. the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn) in

Tallinn, Estonia [46]). Finally, the absence of clear guidelines
with respect to the appropriate ways to use computing
environment may increase individual’s potential for justifying
an online criminal event and result in the development of a
cyber-dependent crime.
C. Attackers’ Goals.
We believe that understanding cyber-criminals’ goals in
launching cyber-dependent crimes against an organization
could improve security officials’ assessments of potential
cyber-risks to their organizations. Specifically, we suspect that
online criminals’ goals in launching cyber-dependent events
could range from a desire to explore computer technology, the
thrill of engaging in illegal activities, willingness to gain
prestige among peers, revenge, obsession, ideology, or
monetary gain [13]. Moreover, it is possible that cybercriminals are willing to engage in online criminal behaviors in
order to obtain more than just one goal. Importantly, previous
works have already identified these goals as important for
assessing potential online offender’ risks of attacking specific
organizations. However, in contrast to past research that listed
these goals as motivations, we follow the rationale proposed in
the criminological literature, and classify this list of desires as
cyber-criminals goals.

Specifically, as indicated in Figure 1, with the exception of
two demographic traits which tend to remain constant over
time (i.e. gender and race), the magnitude and direction of all
the DSK-RAMG model’s components could increase at some
times, decrease in other times, and yet remain unchanged and
stagnate in other occasions. Consider for instance the case of
cyber-warrior and their motivation to engage in cyber-attacks
during times of political and military tensions vs during time
of piece. Indeed, in times of war the situational motivation of
cyber warriors to launch cyber-attacks against rival countries’
targets will be significantly higher than the situational
motivation during peaceful times. Similarly, hacktivists’
motivations to launch cyber-attacks will be higher in times in
which the group is trying to push a political agenda than
during times they are not. Consequently, the potential levels of
threat to targets fluctuates over time and can differ across
times of day, week and even month.

V. CONCRETE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS TO DRAW FROM THE
DSK-RAMG MODEL
The growing number of online offenders who are willing
and capable of launching significant cyber-dependent crimes
against organizations, obligates information technology
officers to adopt security measures that aim to identify likely
threats, harden their organization against likely attack vectors,
and replicate the security measures used in a fortress model
for protecting a physical space [47-48]. Fortress computing
environments, which are commonly adopted by major
governmental agencies and large financial and industrial
organizations, are computing environments within which
substantial control is enforced on users’ access to the
computer network [49]. In line with the value placed in the
model-based approach for describing, analyzing and
identifying cyber-risk, we posit that similarly to Parker’s [14]
and Jones’s [50] models, our proposed model could be
employed for assessing online offenders’ potential threat to an
organization [15]. However, due to the emphasis placed on
situational motivation in the DSK-RAMG model, we propose
that this model may be used for predicting the occurrence of
cyber-dependent crimes. Specifically, we suggest that the
intersection of attackers’ personal traits, skills, knowledge,
resources, authority and situational motivation level to offend
could be effective in assessing online offenders’ threat and
predicting the risk that a cyber-dependent crime will develop.
Indeed, the underlying premise behind Parker’s [14]
SKRAM model is similar to the aforementioned proposition.
However, in contrast to Parker’s focus in a unidimensional
state in which heightened online offender’s SKRAM poses a
greater threat to a target, we propose that fluctuations in online
offenders’ DSK-RAMG components over time, results in
variation in targets’ vulnerability to a potential cyber attack.

Since the motivation to launch a cyber-dependent crime is
originated in the environment (both offline and online) and
could be triggered by unique set of circumstances, we suspect
that it is important to identify situations conducive to cyberdependent crimes, flag their potential influence on different
threat agents, and generate predictions regarding the
likelihood of these situations to result in specific types of
attacks against unique organizations. Moreover, we suspect
that the timing in which situations conducive to cyberdependent crime emerge, may support predictions of the time
frame in which cyber-dependent crimes will occur. Thus, we
adopt Cohen and Felson’s[51] assumption that a successful
criminal event requires the convergence in space and time of
motivated offender, suitable target and the absence of capable
guardian, and suspect that the timing in which a cyberdependent crime will be launched against a target
organization is a function of the culmination of the various
DSK-RAMG model components into a tipping point.
.

VI. CONDUCIVE ENVIRONMENTS FOR THE COLLECTION OF
ATTACKERS’ DSK-RAMPG CUES
Reflecting upon potential ways to apply our claims in the
context of organizational security practices, one may suggest
the potential utility of IDSs and IPSs for predicting cyberdependent crimes and monitoring their development.
However, traditional IDSs and IPSs primarily focus on
detection of malicious activity as or after it happens [52-53].
Similarly, one may point out the availability of current
approaches for event based predictions, such as the rulebased (which are merely expert generate rules [54]), casebased
(which
do
not
include
mechanism
for
discovering temporal correlations),
Finite State Machine
based (which are rarely available in situations where human
actions have significant impact), Model- based (which are
rarely applicable in cyber domains), and Probabilistic (in
which exact inference is intractable) approaches [55-57].
Unfortunately, these approaches draw on problematic (and
sometime unrealistic) assumptions and methodologies.
Therefore, we suspect that there is a need to develop new
security tools that will collect online and offline cues for the
potential development of situations conducive to cyberdependent crimes, and generate predictions regarding the
occurrence, timing and later stages of an attacks. Such tools
should pick cues for the potential increase in situational
motivations to launch cyber-dependent crimes from online
environments (for instance hackers’ forums and social media
sites like Twitter and Facebook which were already proved
useful in forecasting flue epidemics [58], and online threats
like spam [59]), and use these cues to generate probabilities for
the development and progression of cyber-dependent crime
events. We believe that the design of these tools should also
draw on recent successful attempts to assess social media
users’ demographic and personality traits using data from the
online environment [60,61]. Indeed, McCormick and
colleagues [60] have already demonstrated that demographic
information could be easily collected from Twitter users’
accounts by simply viewing users’ profile pictures and
webpage page, and assessing users’ attributes like gender, age,
and race. Similar approach could be taken when colleting data
from Facebook’s users. Moreover, Sumner and associates [61]
showed that Twitter users’ profile attributes and use of
language could be indicative of personality traits that are
associated with the Dark Tried personality (i.e. psychopathy,
narcissism and Machiavellianism) and with the Big Five
Personality Traits (i.e. extraversion, agreeableness, openness,
conscientiousness and neuroticism). Building abilities for data
collection and assessment, could improve organizations’
security posture and their effectiveness in preventing and
mitigating cyber attacks .

our model emphasizes the important contribution of attackers’
personal attributes and goals for initiating cyber-dependent
crimes. Moreover, acknowledging that the motivation to offend
comes both from within and from the environment, we suggest
that cyber-dependent crimes are more likely to occur with the
culmination of the various DSK-RAMG model components
into a tipping point. Drawing on this model, we suspect that
efforts should be made to build security tools that allow the
predictions of both the target and time of cyber-dependent
crimes.
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